“‘The prolonged presence of the military in civilian tasks can lead military leadership to develop interventionist tendencies and to believe in their superior ability to manage society’” – João Honwana[i]
Maputo (MOZTIMES) – President Daniel Chapo has instructed the Mozambican Armed Forces (FADM) to position themselves at the forefront of combating the mass protests that have been occurring across the country since the general election results were announced on 9 October.
Speaking at the “Opening of the 2025 Military Operational Year” in the district of Mocuba, in the central province of Zambézia, Chapo said: “From today, be more active, as courageous as ever, bolder and more pragmatic in military operations. In other words, we are asserting that your workplaces should, preferably, be the operational theatres and the trenches – particularly in the northern operational theatre; here in Zambézia Province, to combat the so-called naparamas and to confront the so-called electoral protests.”
This discourse by Chapo, addressed to the military leadership, is extremely dangerous in a democracy where the Armed Forces have very specific roles, distinct from those of the police.
Before the 1990 Constitution, during the one party state, the Armed Forces in Mozambique were at the service of the party-state. However, since 1990, with the new democratic Constitution, the Armed Forces have become republican and non-partisan, with their central mission being to defend Mozambique’s sovereignty, national independence and territorial integrity.
In Mozambique, as in any democracy, the Armed Forces may intervene to assist the police in ensuring public security. But this only occurs in very specific circumstances in which such intervention is justified. Outside these exceptional circumstances, the police should remain on the streets and the military in the barracks.
This has been the prevailing defence and security regime in Mozambique, from the VI Protocol of the General Peace Agreement between the government and the then rebel movement Renamo (1992) to the most recent National Defence and Security Policy (2019).
By issuing orders to the military leadership for the FADM to position themselves at the forefront of combating mass protests, Daniel Chapo demonstrates a dangerously misguided understanding of the role of the Armed Forces. Whether this ignorance is intentional or due to a lack of knowledge – no one knows for sure except President Chapo himself – the fact remains that the discourse was delivered in the wrong place, to the wrong audience, and, as such, its implementation could bring a wrong outcome.
In an article entitled “Reflections on Defence, Security and Democracy in Mozambique”, published in 1995, João Honwana explains the dangers that discourses such as President Chapo’s can represent.
Firstly, because “the armed forces are designed and trained to use maximum force to destroy the enemy on the battlefield, and not to maintain law and order in an essentially civilian environment”; hence, the author argues that “the military should be solely for combating external threats and not their own compatriots.”
Secondly, Honwana contends that “the involvement of the armed forces in internal security functions considerably weakens their legitimacy in the eyes of important sectors of society and normally exerts a negative influence on their cohesion and morale…”
And finally, the author argues that “the prolonged presence of the military in civilian tasks can undermine their professionalism and combat readiness, and can lead military leadership to develop interventionist tendencies and to believe in their superior ability to manage society.”
Daniel Chapo stated that the mass protests “are illegal, threaten the peace, order and security of citizens (…) and have been sowing mourning among families, destroying public and private infrastructure, as well as ravaging our economy.”
It is undeniable that the protests, as they are unfolding, constitute a serious problem, and urgent measures must be taken to restore normality. However, the solution cannot be to deploy the Armed Forces to combat one’s own compatriots, as per João Honwana’s words.
The protests have a political cause, manifested in the struggle for power and the undeniable electoral fraud that marked the elections which installed Daniel Chapo as President of Mozambique. Consequently, the solution must also be essentially political. A political dialogue with the man who initially called the protests, Venâncio Mondlane, might be the most sensible course of action.
However, Daniel Chapo appears to be doing everything in reverse. He is ignoring his principal political opponent and calling on insignificant parties to simulate a dialogue. This dialogue is, a priori, doomed to fail in its objective of re-establishing stability.
Chapo is spending time and resources engaging in dialogue with RD, PAHUMO, PARENA, PARESO – parties whose acronyms most Mozambicans barely know the meaning of. Chapo himself is aware that this dialogue will not yield results; hence, he is relying on the Armed Forces to resolve a political problem. However, using the military to combat one’s own compatriots is dangerous even for Daniel Chapo himself, as Honwana rightly argues, since it can “lead military leadership to believe in their superior capacity to manage society”. The outcome could have consequences far more dangerous than those of the protests.
[i]Honwana, J. (1995). Reflexão sobre defesa, segurança e democracia em Moçambique. In B. Mazula (Ed.), Eleições, democracia e desenvolvimento (pp. 559–577). Maputo.
