By Lúria Mabui
Maputo (MOZTIMES) – At the end of the last century, Tsebelis (1998)1 developed the theory of “Hidden Games” to explain how the political arena works. Tsebelis’ central assumption is that politics is a dynamic field of strategic interactions, where agents – politicians, parties, the media, among others – play behind the scenes to achieve their interests.
Tsebelis observes that, for the most part, citizens view the political arena in a distorted way, mainly through the lens of media narratives or simplifications presented by political parties. He argues that although many believe they are participating in a transparent democracy, in practice they are exposed to strategic “games” that mask the true intentions of political actors.
This erroneous perception of politics is sustained by a series of stagings by politicians that create a spectacle, a public façade where political choices appear clear, logical and moral, while behind the scenes there is a real manipulation of information and processes. This kind of staging is particularly evident in apparently democratic regimes, where institutions are captured by the ruling party, turning them into vehicles for maintaining power.
In Mozambique, the last electoral process resulted in unprecedented political tension. The great expectation of the population was that the elections would represent an opportunity for change, and so there was great support for the candidate of the opposition, Venâncio Mondlane, at the last minute supported by the PODEMOS party.
However, the results released by the National Electoral Commission (CNE) gave victory to Frelimo’s presidential candidate, Daniel Chapo, sparking a major dispute that has been spreading for over a month, with very negative implications for the country’s security and economy.
Among the disputed electoral irregularities are some of the same basic problems since the democratic transition and the 1994 elections, such as voter registration failures, limitations on freedom of assembly and movement, ballot box stuffing and vote counting failures.
In response to the irregularities, Venâncio Mondlane called for demonstrations all over the country, contesting the results. Contrary to the data released by the CNE, which indicated a victory for Chapo with a margin of 70% against 20% for Mondlane, the demonstrations called by the opposition candidate were very well adhered to throughout the country, especially by young people, showing that the election results are, in fact, fraudulent.
In order to deal with the massive protests, the regime is using its control over state institutions to repress the demonstrations, but also to distort the narrative of the revolution.
Historically, Frelimo has always sought ways to neutralize and weaken the opposition, whether by legal or illegal means, whether through coercion, manipulation of information or the creation of a hostile political environment. During the 16-year civil war between Frelimo and RENAMO, Bueno (2019)2 states that RENAMO was represented as a group of “bandits” that aimed to destroy the state.
The strategy used during the 16-year war seems to be the same as that used today, in 2024, with the regime trying to spread a reinterpretation of historical and social events, transforming any resistance movement or revolution into “acts of vandalism or a ‘coup d’état’. In this way, the regime tries to associate any attempt at change with destruction and chaos, creating a contrast between the order of the past, the situation before the revolution, and the present, marked by the instability and violence associated with change.
However, it is TSEBELIS, George. Hidden games: rational choice in the field of comparative politics. São Paulo: Edusp, 1998 it is fundamental to understand that the acts of vandalism that occur in Mozambique do not represent the root of the problem, but rather a reflection of a failed state. Since its foundation, the Mozambican state has been captured by the system, which has failed to create an effective education system, to discipline civil society and, above all, to provide decent living conditions for the population. At the end of the day, the acts of vandalism experienced as the demonstrations escalated represent the discrimination of a group that has been marginalized by the state’s failure to include them in the planning of inclusive policies.
At the moment, Frelimo, or a wing of the party, realizes that the basis of the protests is related to the level of extreme poverty, the result of decades of bad governance, corruption and a lack of effective public policies. However, for Frelimo, leaving power is not a viable option, above all because a large part of the party’s members, especially the political elite, control big businesses that were not designed in a transparent way and only maintain them thanks to state control.
In August 2023, the Center for Public Integrity (CIP) published a study3 that revealed that many ministers, ex-ministers and former Frelimo fighters hold mining concessions, where, in order to consolidate their presence in the sector, many of these individuals ally themselves with new partners, creating commercial companies or business groups without being seen as the real beneficiaries.
Therefore, thinking about and evaluating political events through the lens of Tsebeli’s “hidden games”, it can be said that there are hidden games in Mozambique, there is a disconnect between what is shown to the public and what really happens behind the scenes in the political arena. There are “movements” in the game that are not visible to everyone. To those who benefit from the narrative of vandalism to whitewash decades of governance that has only benefited minority elites and thrown the majority into poverty and despair. (LM)
- TSEBELIS, George. Jogos ocultos: escolha racional no campo da política comparada. São Paulo: Edusp, 1998. ↩︎
- BUENO, Natália. Reconciliantion in Mozambique: was it ever Achieved? Confilict, security & Development 19 (5): 427-452. https://doi.org/10.1080/14678802.2019.1663037. 2019 ↩︎
- BANDE, Aldemiro. Falta de lei Propicia Corrupção no Sector Extrativo e no Procurement Público. Procurement Público e Parcerias Publico-Privadas 3. https://www.cipmoz.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/08/beneficarios-efectivos-cip.pdf 2023 ↩︎
