Period Covered: 1 to 8 December 2024
Summary
The security situation during the first week of December was marked by the persistence of the terrorist threat in central and southern districts of Cabo Delgado, accompanied by an escalation in activities.
The terrorist operations included attacks on the Defence and Security Forces (FDS), looting of civilian goods, and movements that caused no direct damage. A confrontation in Meluco district highlighted the expansion of attacks into central and southern areas of the province, suggesting the presence of transitional or forwarded operating bases.
During this period, there was a reduction in claims of responsibility for attacks in Cabo Delgado by the Islamic State, attributed to the suppression of the group’s communication channels on Telegram (the platform most utilised for IS propaganda), hampering the dissemination of their messages.
This week’s focus addresses how the post-electoral crisis has redirected the attention of defence and security forces — including military, police, and intelligence services — to the political unrest, inadvertently benefiting insurgents in northern Mozambique.
Key Incidents
2 December 2024
- Location: Mieze Administrative Post, Metuge District
- Incident: A group of 10 to 15 insurgents was spotted by locals moving southward in the district without engaging in hostile actions.
2 December 2024
- Location: Mocímboa da Praia District
- Incident: Insurgents attacked fishermen at Lake Nguri (Muidumbe district), looting fish and other goods from the population. No human casualties were reported.
3 December 2024
- Location: Unidade Village, Mocímboa da Praia District
- Incident: Insurgents looted goods from nearby civilian populations.
4 December 2024
- Location: Chibanga, Mocímboa da Praia District
- Incident: A terrorist attack resulted in looting and the killing of two civilians.
7 December 2024
- Location: Muaguide Village, Meluco District
- Incident: Insurgents armed with machine guns attacked the village, injuring a police officer. The attackers set fire to the police station and the residence of a local leader while looting goods. Further attacks in the region are anticipated.
Assessment
The insurgents are demonstrating a strategic expansion of their activities into central and southern districts of Cabo Delgado, such as Meluco, Metuge, and Chiúre. This movement reflects a deliberate effort to reclaim territories previously under their control, reinforcing the perception that they retain significant operational capabilities.
This escalation coincides with a strategically advantageous moment. The post-electoral crisis, which has diverted the attention and resources of Defence and Security Forces, has created gaps in the operational theatre, enabling insurgents to exploit weaknesses within Mozambique’s defence apparatus. Moreover, this period aligns with the onset of the rainy season, a time when insurgents traditionally stockpile supplies and fortify their hideouts to ensure their survival during a period that typically hampers mobility and operations.
The looting of food supplies from local populations, reported in multiple locations, has served as a critical logistical lifeline for the group, ensuring its operational continuity. This combination of offensive actions and logistical strategies underscores calculated planning by the insurgents, aimed at sustaining their activities while pressuring government forces.
These dynamics underscore the urgent need for integrated and coordinated strategies to counter the terrorist threat. Without a robust and aligned response — both military and civilian — insurgents are likely to consolidate their positions and increase the frequency and lethality of their attacks in the region.
Focus of the Week: Post-Electoral Crisis Benefits Insurgents
Since the presidential and parliamentary elections on 9 October, the Government of Mozambique has redirected the focus of its defence and security forces — including military, police, and intelligence agencies — to manage the post-electoral unrest.
The opposition’s call for a march on Maputo, led by presidential candidate Venâncio Mondlane and initially planned for 7 November, prompted the Government to believe there was an ongoing attempt to seize power by force. In response, personnel and equipment from Cabo Delgado were redeployed to Maputo to protect the capital against popular demonstrations.
Additionally, security forces reinforced the protection of critical state infrastructure in provincial capitals. However, the demonstrations, which have now persisted for approximately six weeks and show signs of escalating violence, have left government forces in a position of operational incapacity to contain the unrest. This fragility is evident in the ease with which demonstrators have infiltrated critical economic infrastructure, such as the Ressano Garcia Thermal Power Plant — responsible for supplying electricity to Maputo, other southern provinces, and for export — and the camp of the Kenmare mining company, without effective resistance from security forces.
Simultaneously, there has been a consolidated expansion of insurgent attacks in Cabo Delgado during this period. As highlighted in this report, insurgents have carried out operations in the north, such as Mocímboa da Praia, as well as in central and southern districts like Metuge and Meluco, exploiting the weaknesses of Defence and Security Forces.
Rwandan forces, deployed to protect strategic gas and mining projects, lack the capacity for territorial occupation. Their role is limited to special operations of assault and clearance, as well as static security in strategic positions.
Should the post-electoral crisis persist, the Defence and Security Forces’ capacity to respond will be further weakened, providing an advantage to insurgents and enabling the continuation and potential expansion of their activities into Cabo Delgado and possibly into Nampula.
Conclusion
The terrorist groups in Cabo Delgado have demonstrated resilience against joint operations by the FADM and RDF, supported by their mastery of the terrain and the vulnerabilities of government forces. This situation is exacerbated by the national political crisis, which has diverted critical resources to manage popular unrest.
The response of the Defence and Security Forces remains constrained by inadequate operational coverage and an inability to address the dual demands of internal security and counter-terrorism simultaneously.
Adopting more effective military and non-military measures will be essential to preventing terrorist groups from reclaiming liberated territories. Additionally, political stabilisation and the reduction of post-electoral tensions are critical to reinforcing security in northern Mozambique. (LR/BN)
